Boeing Altered Critical MCAS Toggle Switches On 737 MAX Before Deadly Crashes

Essentially , putting in an MCAS system to correct a previous design alteration which had now made the aircraft more dynamically unstable was the second mistake.
It is a critical error in the basics of flight itself , which even I as a former low time private pilot could understand. At take off and landing when there angle of attack changes going on all the time, you don’t install a system that requires time to deactivate or correct or research in a manual to  the correct an error that been introduced into the flight control system. You’ve only got seconds to act and anything that requires more than a second to allow full unimpeded manual control  back to the pilot is a time bomb. In this case, assuming a pilot would have immediately deactivated the angle of attack sensors, the computer program that directed the screw motor to adjust the horizontal stabilizer trim tab, or the power to the screw drive motor itself,  it appears that it would have taken  a lot of precious time for the pilot to manually undo the motorized screw driven input by the manual trim control wheel by hus seat, which was not enough time when you are that close to the ground.

Conversely, when you are at Flight level 37 , i.e., flying straight and level at 37,000 feet, why do you need such a system anyway? Even if you encounter turbulence, your best bet is to maintain the flight controls steady and cut power to avoid over stressing the aircraft, but basically you wouldn’t even need an MCAS . The last thing you would interested in is getting some erroneous information when you have been flying straight and level at 37,000 feet for an hour.
In other words, the engineers got the rationale for the  MCAS system totally *** backwards, after they had already made a Frankensteinian modification of the plane with forward off center of gravity / envelope placement of bigger engines. This is incredible stupidity and logic.

here is my summation:
The new Max engines are so large they had to be moved forward on the wing.

The new engine nacelles THEMSELVES generate lift in addition to the normal wing lift.

The new engine nacelle lift is forward of the wings which produces a large torque and jacks the front of the plane up. Once the plane pitches up, the engine nacelles lift gets STRONGER and leads to a runaway pitch up scenario until a stall occurs.

Since this behavior is illegal in a commercial jet, Boeing hid the issue with poor software and did not tell anyone about it.

Including the pilots, airlines, or the FAA.

 

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When Boeing transitioned from the 737 NG model to the 737 MAX, designers altered a toggle switch panel that could have prevented both of the deadly crashes over the last year in Ethiopia and Indonesia, killing a combined 346 people, according to an investigation by the Seattle Times.

On the 737 NG, the right switch was labeled "AUTO PILOT" - and allowed pilots to deactivate the plane's automated stabilizer controls, such as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), suspected to be the culprit in both crashes. The left toggle switch on the NG would deactivate the buttons on the yoke which pilots regularly use to control the horizontal stabilizer.
On the 737 MAX, however, the two switches were altered to perform the same function, according to internal documents reviewed by the Times, so that they would disable all electronic stabilizer controls - including the MCAS and the thumb buttons on the yoke used to control the stabilizer.

(Dimas Ardian / Bloomberg)

Former Boeing flight-controls engineer Peter Lemme, a harsh critic of the MAX design, first raised questions over the switch alteration on his blog, and says he doesn't understand why Boeing made the change.

He said if the company had maintained the switch design from the 737 NG, Boeing could have instructed pilots after the Lion Air crash last year to simply flip the “AUTO PILOT” switch to deactivate MCAS and continue flying with the normal trim buttons on the control wheel. He said that would have saved the Ethiopian Airlines plane and the 157 people on board.
“There’s no doubt in my mind that they would have been fine,” Lemme said. -Seattle Times

Boeing told the Times that they had historically called for pilots to flip both switches to disable a problematic or "runaway" stabilizer, so the button change matched that procedure, adding that the two switches "were retained for commonality of the crew interface."
"Boeing strongly disagrees with any speculation or suggestion that pilots should deviate from these long-established and trained safety procedures," the company added.
During the October Lion Air flight, pilots were reportedly unaware of the MCAS system - while the day before, an off-duty pilot with knowledge of the stabilizer controls helped pilots disable the system on the same plane. Data from the flight revealed that the repeated commands from the MCAS system sent the flight from Bali to Jakarta plummeting into the sea.

After that crash, Boeing issued a directive calling for pilots to use the typical runaway stabilizer procedure to deal with MCAS in the event of a problem. Then pilots would be able to swivel the tail down manually by physically turning a control wheel that connects to the tail via cables.
But on the Ethiopian Airlines flight, the pilots appear to have recognized the errant MCAS problem and flipped the cutoff switches as described in the checklist. But then it appears that the pilots were unable to move the manual wheel, likely because the forces on the tail made it physically challenging to turn. -Seattle Times

After they were able to manually control the stabilizer, the Ethiopian Airlines pilots appear to have flipped the cutoff switches back on, reactivating the MCAS system. Shortly after, it entered a fatal nosedive which killed all 157 people aboard.
"When you’re pulling on the column with 80-100 pounds of force trying to save your life, your troubleshooting techniques are very weak," said aviation consultant Doug Moss. "You need some gut-level instinctive things to do to solve the problem."

A veteran Boeing 737 test pilot said that all Boeing planes have two such cutoff switches, not just the 737. And both he and American Airlines Captain Dennis Tajer, a spokesman for the Allied Pilots Association who flies 737s, said they could think of no existing procedure that called for flipping only one of the switches.
The procedure appears to be designed to prepare for a situation in which the plane’s stabilizer motor is for some reason jammed and moving uncommanded in one direction – a classic “runaway stabilizer” situation. That would require shutting off all power to the motor. -Seattle Times

Notably, the FAA did not notify pilots that the functionality of the switches had been altered, simply noting in its documentation the labeling change "Stab Trim cutout switches panel nomenclature."

source zerohedge

"Something Was Extraordinarily Wrong": Doomed Boeing Swung Up And Down Hundreds Of Feet

One glimpse at the terrifying trajectory of the Ethiopian Airlines jetliner that crashed on Sunday shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa and it is clear something was dreadfully wrong from the start.


As The New York Times notes, controllers also observed that the aircraft, a new Boeing 737 Max 8, was oscillating up and down by hundreds of feet - a sign that something was extraordinarily wrong.

Pilots are reportedly abuzz over publicly available radar data that showed the aircraft had accelerated far beyond what is considered standard practice, for reasons that remain unclear.

“The thing that is most abnormal is the speed,” said John Cox, an aviation safety consultant and former 737 pilot.
“The speed is very high,” said Mr. Cox, a former executive air safety chairman of the Air Line Pilots Association in the United States. “The question is why. The plane accelerates far faster than it should.” -NYT

According to officials with Ethiopian Airlines, the crew of flight 302 told air traffic control they they were experiencing "flight control" problems just a few minutes before contact was lost. Pilot Yared Getachew - who had more than 8,000 hours of flying experience, reported the initial "flight control" problem in a calm voice within one minute of departure. 
According to the radar, the aircraft was flying far below the minimum safe altitude recommended during takeoff. Within two minutes, the plane had climbed to a safer altitude, and the pilot reported that he wanted to remain on a straight course to 14,000 feet.
The plane then proceeded to rapidly climb and fall by hundreds of feet while flying unusually fast, according to the Times. Air traffic controllers "started wondering out loud what the flight was doing."
The plane's trajectory was so erratic that two other Ethiopian flights - 613 and 629, where ordered to remain at higher altitudes.
While the controllers were instructing the other planes to keep their distance, a panicked Captain Getachew interrupted just three minutes into their flight and requested to turn back as the plane accelerated to even higher speeds well beyond the plane's safety limits.

Flight 302 was immediately cleared to turn back, turning right as it climbed even further.
A minute later, it disappeared from the radar while flying over a restricted military zone.
As the Times notes, the crash of flight 302 is reminiscent of the October crash of another Boeing 737 Max 8 which crashed in Indonesia.

Both took place soon after takeoff, and the crews of both planes had sought to return to the airport.
The possibility that the two crashes had a similar cause was central to regulators’ decision to ground all 737 Maxes, a family of planes that entered passenger service less than two years ago.
After the Indonesia crash, a new flight-control system meant to keep the jet from stalling was suspected as a cause. In both cases, pilots struggled to control their aircraft. -NYT

The investigation of the Ethiopian crash is still in its early stages - with the so-called black boxes containing voice and flight data arriving in France on Thursday for further analysis.
Boeing, meanwhile, has been working on a software update for all 737 Max 8 jets which is expected by April. Meanwhile, questions remain over whether pilots should have undergone more training as airlines rolled out more technologically advanced models.
As we reported on Tuesday, several pilots repeatedly warned federal authorities of safety concerns over the 737 Max 8, with one captain calling the plane's flight manual "inadequate and almost criminally insufficient," according to the Dallas Morning News. 
On Wednesday, the chairman of the transportation committee in the House of Representatives, Peter Defazio (D-OR) said he would investigate the FAA's certification of the 737 Max, including whether pilots have received inadequate training.



https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-03-14/something-was-extraordinarily-wrong-doomed-boeing-swung-and-down-hundreds-feet

 As we reported on Tuesday, several pilots repeatedly warned federal authorities of safety concerns over the 737 Max 8, with one captain calling the plane's flight manual "inadequate and almost criminally insufficient," according to the Dallas Morning News. "

Root cause of WHY modern Boeing 737 planes are falling out of the sky at the rate of a dozen per year now

Since the new design change, these babies are flying death traps and BOEING KNOWS IT.

You cannot trust the FAA that
1.  Oversees the air traffic controllers that were criminally destroying evidence with the 9/11 attack details on that day?
2. Refuses to acknowledge or disclose details pertaining to the use of WMD via chemtrail poisoning via the OMEGA SQAUDRON?
3.  Partnered with Boeing/Honeywell on the uninterruptible autopilot dangerously exposing all passengers to remote hijacking , terrorism and death?
This case was already solved if every detail isn't disclosed publicly I'll start to disclose it as future stories as posted. What is it with the corporate/government incompetence, negligence, complicity  and criminality? And why are there never any arrests?

"The Boeing 737 and the Airbus 320 types are single aisle planes with some 150 seats. Both are bread and butter planes sold by the hundreds with a good profit. In 2010 Airbus decided to offer its A-320 with a New Engine Option (NEO) which uses less fuel. To counter the Airbus move Boeing had to follow up. The 737 would also get new engines for a more efficient flight and longer range. The new engines on the 737 MAX are bigger and needed to be placed a bit different than on the older version. That again changed the flight characteristics of the plane by giving it a nose up attitude.
The new flight characteristic of the 737 MAX would have require a retraining of the pilots. But Boeing's marketing people had told their customers all along that the 737 MAX would not require extensive new training. Instead of expensive simulator training for the new type experienced 737 pilots would only have to read some documentation about the changes between the old and the new versions.
To make that viable Boeing's engineers had to use a little trick. They added a 'maneuver characteristics augmentation system' (MCAS) that pitches the nose of the plane down if a sensor detects a too high angle of attack (AoA) that might lead to a stall. That made the flight characteristic of the new 737 version similar to the old one.
But the engineers screwed up.
The 737 MAX has two flight control computers. Each is connected to only one of the two angle of attack sensors. During a flight only one of two computer runs the MCAS control. If it detects a too high angle of attack it trims the horizontal stabilizer down for some 10 seconds. It then waits for 5 seconds and reads the sensor again. If the sensor continues to show a too high angle of attack it again trims the stabilizer to pitch the plane's nose done.
MCSA is independent of the autopilot. It is even active in manual flight. There is a procedure to deactivate it but it takes some time.
One of the angle of attack sensors on the Indonesian flight was faulty. Unfortunately it was the one connected to the computer that ran the MCAS on that flight. Shortly after take off the sensor signaled a too high angle of attack even as the plane was flying in a normal climb. The MCAS engaged and put the planes nose down. The pilots reacted by disabling the autopilot and pulling the control stick back. The MCAS engaged again pitching the plane further down. The pilots again pulled the stick. This happened some 12 times in a row before the plane crashed into the sea.
To implement a security relevant automatism that depends on only one sensor is extremely bad design. To have a flight control automatism engaged even when the pilot flies manually is also a bad choice. But the real criminality was that Boeing hid the feature.
Neither the airlines that bought the planes nor the pilots who flew it were told about MCAS. They did not know that it exists. They were not aware of an automatic system that controlled the stabilizer even when the autopilot was off. They had no idea how it could be deactivated."

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/03/boeing-the-faa-and-why-two-737-max-planes-crashed.html

Boeing, being part of the Illumnait NWO baby killer crowd, fired most of their most intelligent engineers in the last few years and replaced them. They brag about it. Okeeday.

Canada has announced a nationwide ban on Boeing 737 MAX flights in its airspace, citing “new data” linking two deadly crashes. Info from the US federal database revealed pilots have long been complaining about the plane’s issues.

In a statement to the press, Transport Minister Marc Garneau announced that the “new data” influencing the decision came from “validated satellite tracking,” and that it suggested similarities between the two crashes involving the new Boeing jet. Although the data was sufficient to justify shutting down Canadian airspace to all flights involving the commercial jet, the minister stressed it was too soon to draw any conclusions.